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Abstract: Between 1990 and 2007, 15 southern white (Ceratotherium simum simum) and black (Diceros
bicornis) rhinoceroses on average were killed illegally every year in South Africa. Since 2007 illegal killing
of southern white rhinoceros for their horn has escalated to >950 individuals/year in 2013. We conducted
an ecological–economic analysis to determine whether a legal trade in southern white rhinoceros horn could
facilitate rhinoceros protection. Generalized linear models were used to examine the socioeconomic drivers of
poaching, based on data collected from 1990 to 2013, and to project the total number of rhinoceroses likely to
be illegally killed from 2014 to 2023. Rhinoceros population dynamics were then modeled under 8 different
policy scenarios that could be implemented to control poaching. We also estimated the economic costs and
benefits of each scenario under enhanced enforcement only and a legal trade in rhinoceros horn and used a
decision support framework to rank the scenarios with the objective of maintaining the rhinoceros population
above its current size while generating profit for local stakeholders. The southern white rhinoceros population
was predicted to go extinct in thewild<20 years under presentmanagement. The optimal scenario tomaintain
the rhinoceros population above its current size was to provide a medium increase in antipoaching effort and
to increase the monetary fine on conviction. Without legalizing the trade, implementing such a scenario would
require covering costs equal to approximately $147,000,000/year. With a legal trade in rhinoceros horn, the
conservation enterprise could potentially make a profit of $717,000,000/year. We believe the 35-year-old ban
on rhinoceros horn products should not be lifted unless the money generated from trade is reinvested in
improved protection of the rhinoceros population. Because current protection efforts seem to be failing, it is
time to evaluate, discuss, and test alternatives to the present policy.
Keywords: African rhinos, CITES, conservation policy, economics, poaching, population model
El Grano de los Datos de Costo Econo´mico con Referencia Espacial y de Beneficio a la Biodiversidad y la Efectividad
de una Estrategia de Determinacio´n de Costos
Resumen: Entre 1990 y 2007, en promedio fueron cazados ilegalmente cada an˜o 15 rinocerontes suren˜os
blancos (Ceratotherium simum simum) y negros (Diceros bicornis) en Suda´frica. Desde 2007 la caza ilegal de
rinocerontes suren˜os blancos por su cuerno ha escalado a ma´s de 950 individuos al an˜o en 2013. Llevamos a
cabo un ana´lisis ecolo´gico-econo´mico para determinar si el comercio legal de cuerno de rinoceronte suren˜o
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blanco podr´ıa facilitar la proteccio´n del rinoceronte. Se usaronmodelos lineales generalizados para examinar
a los conductores socio-econo´micos de la caza furtiva, con base en datos colectados desde 1990 hasta 2013,
y tambie´n para proyectar el nu´mero total de rinocerontes con probabilidad de ser cazados ilegalmente
desde 2014 hasta 2023. Las dina´micas poblacionales de los rinocerontes fueron entonces modeladas bajo
ocho escenarios pol´ıticos diferentes que podr´ıan implementarse para controlar la caza furtiva. Tambie´n
estimamos los costos econo´micos y los beneficios de cada escenario solamente bajo la ejecucio´n aumentada
del plan de manejo y el comercio legal de cuerno de rinoceronte y usamos un marco de trabajo de apoyo a
decisiones para ordenar los escenarios con el objetivo de mantener la poblacio´n de rinocerontes por encima de
su taman˜o actual mientras se generan ganancias para los accionistas locales. Se predijo que la poblacio´n de
rinocerontes suren˜os blancos se extinguir´ıa en menos de 20 an˜os bajo el manejo actual. El escenario o´ptimo
para mantener la poblacio´n de rinocerontes por encima de su taman˜o actual fue el de proporcionar un
incremento mediano en el esfuerzo contra la caza furtiva e incrementar la multa monetaria de la condena.
Sin legalizar el mercado, implementar tal escenario requerir´ıa cubrir costos de aproximadamente $147, 000,
000 al an˜o. Con un comercio legal de cuerno de rinoceronte, la iniciativa de conservacio´n podr´ıa ganar
potencialmente $717, 000, 000 al an˜o. Creemos que la prohibicio´n de 35 an˜os de los productos de cuerno de
rinoceronte no deber´ıa ser levantada a menos que el dinero generado de este comercio sea reinvertido en
la proteccio´n mejorada de la poblacio´n de rinocerontes. Ya que los esfuerzos de proteccio´n actuales parecen
estar fallando, es momento de evaluar, discutir y probar alternativas a la pol´ıtica actual.
Palabras Clave: caza furtiva, CITES, economı´a, modelo poblacional, pol´ıtica de conservacio´n, rinocerontes
Africanos
Introduction
Africa supports 2 species of rhinoceros, and South Africa
is internationally recognized for its success in conserving
both species (Linklater 2003). Fewer than 50 southern
white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum simum) prob-
ably remained in the former province of Natal by 1895, af-
ter white settlers had overhunted them throughout most
of their historical range (Emslie et al. 2009). In situ recov-
ery strategies were then developed to bring this iconic
species back from the brink of extinction, including the
establishment of protected areas on state and private
land and translocation of rhinoceros back to their his-
toric range (Emslie et al. 2009). South Africa now has ap-
proximately 19,000 southern white rhinoceroses, some
95% of Africa’s total population in 2010 (Emslie et al.
2013). As a result of ongoing demand for rhinoceros horn
in East Asia and the Middle East, numbers of the more
wide-ranging black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis) plum-
meted from an estimated 100,000 across Africa in 1960
to <2500 in 1995 (Leader-Williams 2003). Contrastingly,
South Africa bucked this trend through sound protection
and management, and numbers of its black rhinoceros
increased from 630 in 1980 to 1915 by 2010, some 40% of
Africa’s black rhinoceros population (Emslie et al. 2013).
Between 1990 and 2007, only 15 rhinoceroses on average
were poached every year in South Africa. However, illegal
killing of black and, mostly, southern white rhinoceros
has escalated since 2007; the rate of poaching increased
exponentially from 0.03 rhinoceroses/day prior to 2007
to 2.75/day in 2013 (Department of Environmental Affairs
2014).
Rhinoceros horn has historically been in demand for
traditional Chinese medicine and ornamental use in East
Asia and the Middle East (Graham-Rowe 2011). In 1977,
an international ban on all trade in rhinoceros products
was agreed under the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
(Leader-Williams 2003). The Appendix I listing of all
species of African and Asian rhinoceroses sought to re-
duce demand in consuming countries and to halt poach-
ing (Leader-Williams 2003). However, the ban has not
achieved its purpose, as demonstrated by ongoing poach-
ing of rhinoceroses in both Africa and Asia (Milliken &
Shaw 2012). Recently, 2 subspecies of rhinoceroses, the
Vietnamese subspecies of Javan rhinoceros (Rhinoceros
sondaicus annamiticus) and thewest African subspecies
of black rhinoceros (D. bicornis longipes), have be-
come extinct in the wild, whereas the northern white
rhinoceros (C. simum cottoni) teeters on the edge of
extinction (Emslie et al. 2013). Cultural, historical, and
more recent beliefs render rhinoceros horn a luxury good
and a must-have status symbol, and it is used in medicines
in countries such as China and Vietnam (Graham-Rowe
2011; Milliken & Shaw 2012). Thus, the illegal market
for rhinoceros horn has become more profitable for
poaching syndicates, which, by controlling the market,
can stockpile in anticipation of future price rises (Mason
et al. 2012).
Conservationists in South Africa have been consider-
ing alternative approaches to curbing poaching for some
years. Rather than placing an even greater focus on im-
proved law enforcement and demand reduction in the
Far East (Lawson & Vines 2014), some of those who bear
the costs of rhinoceros conservation in South Africa ad-
vocate the introduction of a legal trade in southern white
rhinoceros horn (Biggs et al. 2013). Because the market
in rhinoceros horn has been illegal since 1977, there is a
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the main parts of the
simulation framework (boxes, different parts of the
framework; arrows, variables transferred from one
part to another). Poaching and population models are
updated each from 2014 to 2023.
lack of data on price increases and quantity demanded by
consumers over time, which prevent the estimation of a
full-price quantity model for rhinoceros horn. (See, e.g.,
Van Kooten [2008] for a dynamic bioeconomic model
of ivory trade.) However, unprecedented poaching rates
are also expected to cause declines in the biggest white
rhinoceros population in Kruger National Park, which is
now heavily targeted by poachers (Ferreira et al. 2012).
Because it is the intention of the South African gov-
ernment to submit a proposal to legalize the trade in
rhinoceros horn at the next Conference of the Parties of
CITES in 2016, it is timely to develop quantitative stud-
ies that can provide improved information to decision
makers (Leader-Williams 2013). Hence, we modeled the
dynamics of the rhinoceros population and poaching.We
investigated whether the funding generated by introduc-
ing a quota system under a central selling organization
could be used to enhance rhinoceros protection while
providing economic incentives to local stakeholders.
Methods
We developed a simulation framework that integrates
poaching and population models with an economic
model to investigate how 8 different policy scenarios,
which would be implemented to control illegal killing,
could improve the protection of the southern white
rhinoceros population in South Africa (Fig. 1). The
poaching model was first used to examine the socioe-
conomic drivers of poaching based on data collected
from 1990 to 2013 and then to predict in combina-
tion with the population model the total number of
rhinoceroses illegally killed from 2014 to 2023 under 8
policy scenarios. We also estimated the economic costs
and benefits of each scenario under enhanced enforce-
ment only and a legal trade and used a decision support
framework to rank the scenarios with the objective of
maintaining the rhinoceros population above its current
size while generating profit for local stakeholders. A le-
gal trade in rhinoceros horn does not imply any killing
of rhinoceroses. Rhinoceros horn could be harvested
from individuals that die of natural causes; it can also
be harvested from live animals with minimum risk to the
rhinoceroses (Lindsey & Taylor 2011).
Poaching Model
The number of rhinoceroses poached per year was
used as an indicator of poaching. We chose the candi-
date explanatory variables based on prior expectation of
their relevance to illegal killing of rhinoceroses (Leader-
Williams et al. 1990; Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland
1993; Milner-Gulland 1993; Jachmann & Billiouw 1997;
Lemieux & Clarke 2009; Poudyal et al. 2009). The vari-
ables used in the poaching model and data sources are
summarized in Supporting Information. The maximum
fine upon conviction (corrected for inflation) and the
number of years in prison were included in the poaching
model to delineate the relative importance of penalties
when illegal traders and poachers get caught. The total
number of field rangers deployed for antipoaching activ-
ities was used to evaluate the antipoaching effort. We in-
cluded the total number of southern white rhinoceroses
for each year of simulation to examine the effect the
increasing rhinoceros population has had on poaching.
To understand the impact on poaching of an increase
in rhinoceros horn price, we used the gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita for Far East Asia as a proxy for
illegal price. We used GDP for Far East Asia because it is
strongly correlated with GDP in both Vietnam and China,
which are currently considered the largest markets for
rhinoceros horn (Milliken & Shaw 2012). The GDP
per capita for Mozambique, which is the country from
whichmost arrested poachers originate (Milliken & Shaw
2012), was used as an indicator for the lack of alternative
economic opportunities. Governance was based on 6
indicators (voice or accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law, and control of corruption). Principal components
analyses showed that 89% of variation between these
Conservation Biology
Volume 29, No. 2, 2015
548 Legal Trade in Rhinoceros Horn
indicators was captured by a single component
(hereafter called governance). We also included
potential effects that stricter regulations to prevent Far
Eastern nationals from acquiring rhinoceros horn
through so-called pseudo-hunts and through a ban
on domestic trade on rhinoceros horn, which were
implemented in South Africa after 2008, have had on
poaching of rhinoceroses (Milliken & Shaw 2012).
We used an information theoretic approach (Burnham
& Anderson 2002) and Akaike’s information criterion
corrected for finite sample sizes (AICc) to calculate
statistical models. We used generalized linear models
with a negative-binomial error distribution and a log-link
function to examine the socioeconomic drivers of
poaching. We determined the magnitude and direction
of the coefficients for the independent variables with
multimodel averaging implemented in the R (version
3.1.0) (R Core Development Team 2014) package
glmulti (Calcagno 2010). The relative importance of
each predictor variable was measured as the sum of the
Akaikeweights over the 10 top-rankedmodels containing
the parameter of interest (Conroy & Brook 2003). Finally,
we validated the top-ranked model by using leave-one-
out cross validation, which is used to estimate the mean
model-predictor error by successively omitting 1 observa-
tion from the training data set and using it for validation.
Population Model
We developed a population model for southern white
rhinoceros in RAMAS GIS (version 6) (Akc¸akaya & Root
2013). Overall, the population dynamics of both black
and white rhinoceros are well known because their pop-
ulations have been extensively monitored in the wild
(Conway & Goodman 1989; Owen-Smith 2007; Di Minin
et al. 2013b). We modeled southern white rhinoceros
population dynamics with a stochastic age-structured de-
mographic model based on 11 age classes for both males
and females. Fecundity in the model was based on the
product of the probability of breeding, sex ratio at birth,
average number of calves, and first year survival (Support-
ing Information for more details). Survival rates for each
age class were calculated independently from this study
based on long-term censuses (Owen-Smith 1988, 2007).
More details are provided in Supporting Information. The
most important parameters included in the population
model are summarized in Table 1.
We used the total number of the southern white
rhinoceros in South Africa in 2010 (18,780) as the ini-
tial population size (Emslie et al. 2013). We calculated
the ecological carrying capacity (K), which depends on
the amount of forage produced based on rainfall (Martin
2011). Details on how K was calculated are provided
in Supporting Information. A ceiling model of density
dependence was used to approximate the intraspecific
competition for resources as the population approaches
carrying capacity (Owen-Smith 2007). In each simulation,
which was run 10,000 times, we accounted for envi-
ronmental and demographic stochasticity (Akc¸akaya &
Root 2013).
We developed a global sensitivity analysis to exam-
ine the impact of varying the values of key model
parameters (carrying capacity, survival for each age
class, and fecundity for breeding age classes) on the
southern white rhinoceros mean final population size
(Iman et al. 1981). Specifically, we used Latin hyper-
cube sampling with 100 sampling dimensions to simul-
taneously vary the values of each parameter randomly
from within 100 evenly sized partitions across ±10%
ranges. The Latin hypercube sampling was performed
with the R package lhs (Carnell 2009). For each iter-
ation of randomly selected parameter values, we pro-
jected the southern white rhinoceros population for 10
years and recorded the mean final population size. We
then fit a generalized linear model with the mean fi-
nal population size as the response and the varied pa-
rameters as fixed effects. To assess the sensitivity of
the model to the input parameters, we measured the
relative importance of each predictor variable as the sum
of the Akaike weights over the 10 top-rankedmodels con-
taining the parameter of interest (McCarthy et al. 1995;
Conroy & Brook 2003).
Economic Model
The population model was used as an input to an eco-
nomic model that we used to calculate the net present
value of southernwhite rhinoceros conservation in South
Africa. First, we calculated the net present value under
a legal trade whereby the trading of a yearly quota was
promoted, as an alternative to a trade ban, to finance
additional enforcement, and disrupt illegal activities to
safeguard the rhinoceros population. Promoting strict
quantities through a quota system is more beneficial than
a supply-side approach to rhinoceros conservation (e.g.,
Bulte & Damania 2005). When policy that restricts the
trading quota is in place, in fact, the competition between
legal suppliers and illegal traders is restricted, potentially
decreasing poaching pressure (Bulte & Damania 2005).




(Vt + Ht − Ct )
(1 + δ)t , (1)
where Vt is the profit derived from selling an effective
quota of rhinoceros horn; Ht is the total profit derived
from trophy hunting and live sales; Ct is the total cost
to protect the rhinoceros population; and δ is a discount
factor (5.5%) on the basis of cost of borrowing money in
South Africa in 2012 (International Monetary Fund 2012).
The Vt was calculated as
Vt = piwyt , (2)
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Table 1. Parameter ranges used in the southern white rhinoceros population model.
Parameter Description Value SD References
S1 calf survival 0.950 0.0095 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S2 survival 1–2 years 0.965 0.0096 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S3 survival 2–3 years 0.965 0.0096 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S4 survival 3–4 years 0.975 0.0097 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S5 survival 4–5 years 0.975 0.0097 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S6 survival 5–6 years 0.975 0.0097 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S7 survival 6–7 years 0.985 0.0098 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S8 survival 7–8 years 0.985 0.0098 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S9 survival 8–9 years 0.985 0.0098 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S10 survival 9–10 years 0.985 0.0098 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
S11 adult survival 0.977 0.0075 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
F8 fecundity 7- to 8-year-olds 0.225 0.0045 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
F9 fecundity 8- to 9-year-olds 0.225 0.0045 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
F10 fecundity 9- to 10-year-olds 0.225 0.0045 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
F11 fecundity adults 0.200 0.0038 Owen-Smith (1988, 2007)
N initial population size 18,780 – Emslie et al. (2013)
K carrying capacity 42,500 2,125 based on Martin (2011)
where w is the average weight (4 kg) of a horn (Milliken
& Shaw 2012), pl is the whole-horn market price, and Yt
is the legal stock of rhinoceros horn. We set pl to 20,000,
40,000, and 60,000 U.S. dollar/kg to show the potential
revenue generated under a low, medium, and high selling
price. At any time, the legal stock of rhinoceros horn Yt
was by
Yt = st + nt + dt , (3)
where st is the proportion of the previously accumu-
lated stock on sale for that year, nt is the addition to the
stock due to natural mortalities for that year, and dt is
the addition to the stock by dehorning the proportion of
the rhinoceros population found on private conservation
land (approximately 24%). In 2013, the stock size (st ) was
approximately 16,600 horns.
We calculated the total profit derived from trophy
hunting and live sales (Ht ) at year t was
Ht = Gt + Zt , (4)
where Gt is the profit generated from trophy hunting and
Zt is the profit generated from live sales. We accounted
for trophy hunting in the population model by removing
a fixed proportion of the adult population every year of
simulation:
N11,t+1 = S11 (1 − v11) N11, (5)
Where S11 is the adult survival rate and v11 is the harvest-
ing rate for adults calculated based on the 1% proportion
of the total rhinoceros population hunted per year for
trophies from 2000 to 2010 (Milliken & Shaw 2012). We
then calculated the gross profit generated from trophy
hunting as
Gt = phv11N11, (6)
where ph is the average trophy hunting price of
$31,629/rhinoceros from 2000 to 2010 (Milliken & Shaw
2012). We calculated the gross profit from live sales as
Zt = pslt Nt , (7)
where ps is the average live sale price of
$18,950/rhinoceros auctioned from 2000 to 2010 (Mil-
liken & Shaw 2012) and lt is the 4% proportion of the
total population sold per year from2000 to 2010 (Milliken
& Shaw 2012). We hypothetically started legal trade in
2016, after the next CITESmeeting will take place. There-
fore, from 2014 to 2016 gross profit was generated only
from trophy hunting and live sales.
We calculated the total cost to protect the rhinoceros
population (Ct )
Ct = Ztc, (8)
where Zt is the number of field rangers deployed
to protect the rhinoceros population and c is the
protection cost per ranger deployed. We used cheap
($29,500/ranger), average ($31,000/ranger), and expen-
sive ($37,621/ranger) values for c according to field bud-
gets from protected areas that have had different levels
of poaching. Although c is here considered as cost per
ranger deployed, it also accounts for other important
protection costs (e.g., ranger salaries, vehicles running
costs, communication costs, consumption, rewards to
informers, etc.).
Second, we compared the economic model for a legal
trade to an alternative scenario, which maintains the sta-
tus quo and generates profit for rhinoceros conservation
via trophy hunting and live sales only (Di Minin et al.





(Ht − Ct )
(1 + δ)t , (9)
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where Ht is the total profit derived from trophy hunting
and live sales and δ is a discount factor (5.5%) on the
basis of cost of borrowing money in South Africa in 2012
(International Monetary Fund 2012).
Our estimates of the net present value of south-
ern white rhinoceros conservation can be considered
conservative because we did not include economic re-
turns from ecotourism (Di Minin et al. 2013a).
Policy Scenarios
We modeled near-future southern white rhinoceros dy-
namics for 13 years, 2010–2023. We used the predict
function in R (R Core Development Team 2014) to pre-
dict the total number of rhinoceroses illegally killed be-
tween 2014 and 2023 by projecting the values of the
variables with the highest relative importance (0.8) in
the poaching model into the future. As an input, the
population model provided the poaching model with the
total number of rhinoceroses for each year of simulation.
In the population model, we considered the immature,
subadult, and adult age classes to be targeted by poach-
ers (Ferreira et al. 2012). Particularly, we tested the ef-
fects of doubling the monetary fine and increasing the
antipoaching effort (small, medium, and large increase in
the number of field rangers) on poaching of rhinoceroses
under increasing wealth in Far East Asia (Supporting In-
formation). We used the projected GDP for Far East Asia
from 2014 (International Monetary Fund 2012) to pre-
dict the average number of rhinoceroses illegally killed
in each year. To take uncertainty about projected GDPs
into account, we developed pessimistic and optimistic
economic scenarios (Supporting Information), where the
GDP for Far East Asia increased at the maximum and the
minimum rate recorded from 2003 to 2013 (International
Monetary Fund 2012). This allowed us to derive upper
and lower envelopes of uncertainty for the population
trajectory from the 95% confidence intervals.
Scenario Ranking
A formof uncertainty analysiswas used to rank alternative
policy scenarios in a robust manner. We ran a large num-
ber (10,000) of simulation replicates for the stochastic
demographic model, accounting for environmental and
demographic stochasticity. From these simulations, we
derived upper and lower envelopes of outcome from the
95% confidence intervals of the output of the rhinoceros
populationmodel and the economicmodel. Performance
in terms of the rhinoceros population was defined as the
population size at the end of the planning horizon (2023).
Equations (1) or (9) were used in the calculation of total
profit, depending on whether the trade was legalized or
not. Quasihyperbolic time discounting was used with a
5.5% discount rate, and β = 1 (Green & Myerson 2002)
was used to summarize the economic performance of
Figure 2. Relative importance of the most important
variables affecting rhinoceros poaching. The response
variable is the number of rhinoceroses illegally killed
in South Africa from 1990 to 2013.
the scenarios across time. When comparing scenarios,
we considered the lower 95% performance of a scenario
as its robust performance. The best scenarios were identi-
fied as the most profitable (or least expensive) ones that
95% guaranteed that the rhinoceros population would
not decline by 2023. Scenario ranking was implemented
in RobOff software (Pouzols et al. 2012; Pouzols &
Moilanen 2013). See Supporting Information for details.
Results
According to the generalized linear models (Table 2), the
best overall predictors of rhinoceros poaching in South
Africa were the GDP per capita in Far East Asia, the
antipoaching effort, and fine upon conviction (Fig. 2).
The rhinoceros population size also had a large effect
on rhinoceros poaching (Fig. 2). The top-ranked model,
which included these variables, had an AICc weight
of 0.47. The coefficients for fine upon conviction and
antipoaching effort had—as expected—a negative sign,
indicating that an increase is expected to result in a
decrease in poaching. Governance in Vietnam, GDP per
capita in Mozambique, years in prison, the restrictions
preventing Far Eastern nationals from acquiring
rhinoceros horn through so-called pseudo-hunts and a
domestic trade in South Africa, as well as governance in
Mozambique, had much smaller effects on rhinoceros
poaching (Fig. 2). The coefficients for governance in
Vietnam, GDP per capita in Mozambique, years in prison,
and governance in Mozambique had—as expected—a
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Table 2. Top-ranked predictors of rhinoceros poaching in South Africa.
AICcb
No. of Change relative to Percentage of
Modela variables the top-ranked model Weight deviance explained
WRhPopSize + MonFine + APEff +
GDP ̲ FEA
4 0.00 0.47 88.79
WRhPopSize + MonFine + APEff
+ GDP ̲ Moz + GDP ̲ FEA
5 2.46 0.19 88.18
WRhPopSize + MonFine + APEff
+ GDP̲Moz + GDP̲FEA + Gov ̲ Viet
6 2.56 0.11 90.29
WRhPopSize + MonFine + APEff
+ GDP ̲ FEA + Gov ̲ Viet
5 2.71 0.09 90.67
WRhPopSize + MonFine + APEff
+ GDP ̲ FEA + Gov ̲ Moz
5 2.90 0.07 89.13
WRhPopSize + MonFine + APEff
+ GDP ̲ FEA + YearsPris
5 6.17 0.02 88.69
WRhPopSize + Ban + MonFine +
APEff + GDP ̲ FEA
5 6.51 0.02 90.60
 MonFine + APEff + GDP ̲ FEA +
YearsPris
4 6.55 0.02 87.96
WRhPopSize + MonFine + APEff +
GDP ̲ Moz + GDP ̲ FEA + YearsPris
6 7.44 0.01 88.41
 MonFine + APEff + GDP ̲ Moz +
GDP ̲ FEA + Gov ̲ Viet
5 12.10 0.00 90.44
aRelationships between the predictors and the response variables (number of rhinoceroses killed illegally) are correlative. Plus signs imply
additive terms in the model. WRhPopSize, rhinoceros population size; MonFine, maximum monetary fine for rhinoceros poaching corrected for
inflation; APEff, conservation effort measured as the number of field rangers deployed for antipoaching activities; GDP ̲ FEA, gross domestic
product per capita Far East Asia; GDP ̲ Moz, gross domestic product per capita for Mozambique; YearsPris, years in prison upon conviction; Gov
̲ Viet, governance index for Vietnam; Gov ̲ Moz, governance for Mozambique; Ban, restrictions on Far Eastern nationals to acquire rhinoceros
horn from domestic stocks and legal trophy hunts.
bAkaike’s information criterion corrected for finite sample sizes.
Figure 3. Predicted southern white rhinoceros abundance from 2014 to 2023 under 8 policy scenarios that could
be implemented to reduce poaching in South Africa. The uncertainty envelopes correspond to the average
abundance projected under a scenario of maximum (lower envelope) and minimum (upper) increase in the GDP
in Far East Asia. The horizontal dotted line is the southern white rhinoceros population size in 2010.
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negative sign, indicating that an increase is expected to
result in a decrease in poaching. With the leave-one-out
cross validation, the top-ranked model (Table 2) had a
mean prediction error of approximately 10%.
The future predictions for rhinoceros poaching
under the 8 policy scenarios suggested that increasing
the antipoaching effort and the monetary fine upon
conviction would be crucial to maintain the population
at or above its current size under increasing wealth in Far
East Asia (Fig. 3). Notably, the population (in the wild)
was predicted to go extinct around 2023 under present
management (business as usual). Increasing only the
monetary fine did not effectively conserve the southern
white rhinoceros population in South Africa (Fig. 3). Sur-
vival of adults, calves, 1- to 2-year-olds, 4- to 5-year-olds,
and 6- to 7-year-olds was the most influential parameter in
the sensitivity analysis for the populationmodel (Support-
ing Information). The other important parameters of the
populationmodel were fecundity of adults and survival of
8- to 9-year-olds; all other parameters had smaller effects.
Under enhanced enforcement only, maintaining the
population was extremely expensive (Supporting In-
formation), whereas legalizing the trade increased the
size of the population and generated profit under en-
hanced law enforcement (Supporting Information). Ac-
cording to the scenario ranking, the optimal scenario
to maintain the rhinoceros population above its size
in 2010, while maximizing profit, was to provide the
medium increase in antipoaching effort and to increase
the fine upon conviction (Table 3). Without legalizing
the trade, maintaining the population above its cur-
rent size required covering costs equal to approximately
$147,000,000/year under themost cost-effective scenario
(Table 3).With a legal trade in rhinoceros horn, under the
same scenario, the conservation enterprise made a profit
of $717,000,000/year (Table 3). By 2023, under the same
policy scenario, the net profit generated through the legal
trade was predicted to exceed $1,000,000,000 and the
southern white rhinoceros population was predicted to
increase to approximately 35,000 individuals (Supporting
Information).
Discussion
Our results suggest that the funds generated by selling a
quota under a central selling organization could be used
to enhance law enforcement to levels that would under-
mine illegal poaching activities. Meanwhile, the profit
generated from the legal trade in horn could be used for
human and economic development of local stakeholders
and to protect other biodiversity. Legalizing the trade
without improving the protection of the rhinoceros pop-
ulation will not, according to our results, generate extra
benefits for rhinoceros conservation.
Our results suggest that the rapid increase in poaching
can be attributed to growing demand for rhinoceros horn
from Far East Asia. The significance of the population
size variable highlights how increasing the size of the
rhinoceros population over time has made South Africa
themain target for criminal syndicates seeking rhinoceros
horn. At the same time, law enforcement levels (both
fine upon conviction and anti-poaching effort) appear to
be too low to disrupt illegal activities. In particular, the
antipoaching effort, whichwe evaluated as the total num-
ber of field rangers deployed to protect rhinoceroses,
was insufficient for counteracting the current spike in
rhinoceros poaching—a finding in line with prior studies
(Leader-Williams et al. 1990; Leader-Williams & Milner-
Gulland 1993; Poudyal et al. 2009). In addition, the mon-
etary fine upon conviction most likely represents a small
tax for criminal syndicates compared with the revenue
they generate illegally. As recent policy recommenda-
tions suggest, prosecutors in South Africa should consider
increasing fines, as well as enforcing asset forfeitures, as
an increased deterrent to criminals (Emslie et al. 2013).
Although other variables had less effect in the poach-
ing model, they reinforced our main results. A large
threat to the rhinoceros population is surely the re-
ward that poachers from impoverished communities in
Mozambique, bordering Kruger National Park, receive
for rhinoceros horns. Considering how cheap it might
be for criminal syndicates to recruit new poachers in
the future, it is of crucial importance, as we highlight
below, that more funding is generated to increase the
antipoaching effort to deter rhinoceros poachers. This
should happen in combination with increased penalties
upon conviction both in terms of monetary fines and im-
prisonment, as suggested by the poaching model. Finally,
results of the poaching model suggest that an improve-
ment in governance in Vietnam would help decrease
poaching. Although this is a challenging goal, it is key
that the Vietnamese government implement measures
that limit opportunities for corruption that can result in
the successful prosecution and punishment of rhinoceros
horn smugglers (Milliken & Shaw 2012).
Reducing demand for rhinoceros horn through con-
sumer behavior modification and conservation education
is unlikely in the short term because of long-established
cultural beliefs; use of rhinoceros horn has continued
since the trade ban was implemented in 1977 (Rivalan
et al. 2007; Graham-Rowe 2011). Our model predicted
that increasing poaching of subadults and adults will
have a negative impact on the dynamics of the south-
ern white rhinoceros population in the imminent future.
Ensuring population viability under increased poaching
levels will require using many tens of millions of dollars
every year just for rhinoceros protection alone, which
is problematic in areas where pressing issues of human
development remain a societal priority (Adams et al.
2004). Private and communal landowners would find it
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Table 3. Ranking of the most robust policy scenarios to reduce rhinoceros poaching and increase population size and profit in South Africa between
2014 and 2023.∗
Total profit with Rhinoceros Total profit, no
Rank Scenario legal trade (MM US$) population size trade (MM US$)
1 medium increase in no. of rangers & fine 717 25,690 −147
2 big increase in no. of rangers & fine 709 34,920 −189
3 big increase in no. of rangers 698 34,356 −190
4 medium increase in no. of rangers 629 18,886 −149
5 small increase in no. of rangers & fine 583 3,332 −132
6 small increase in no. of rangers 456 0 −136
7 no trade (business as usual) 353 0 −128
8 increase fine only 334 0 −123
∗Only the 4 top scenarios maintain the rhinoceros population above its size in 2010, and a positive total profit is only possible for scenarios
with legal trade. The values shown are robust. For more information see Supporting Information.
almost impossible to cover such protection costs unless
alternative sources of funding were found. Hence, an
important contribution that the legal trade could make is
to cover such costs, at least in the short term, until other
measures over longer periods lead to a reduction in de-
mand from users in the Far East. In addition, a legal supply
of rhinoceros horn could potentially diminish the pres-
tige value that has recently emerged in Vietnam (Milliken
& Shaw 2012).
At the same time, the profit generated from the legal
trade could also be used to financially empower com-
munities in Mozambique, where many poachers origi-
nate, in accordance with some of the principles of the
London Conference on Wildlife Crimes (Lawson & Vines
2014). Although increasing enforcement only might not
keep criminals from committing a crime (Ariely 2012),
economic incentivesmay be an important solution to pro-
mote participation of local communities in improved en-
forcement (but see Andrade & Rhodes 2012). Enhanced
enforcement combined with effective engagement with
local communities, for example, has enabled Nepal to not
lose a single rhinoceros to poaching in 2011 and 2013
(Emslie et al. 2013). Finally, the funding generated from
the legal trade could also be used for the protection of
other biodiversity via the umbrella effect of rhinoceroses
(Di Minin et al. 2013c; Di Minin & Moilanen 2014).
Because the market in rhinoceros horn has been il-
legal since 1977, there is a lack of data, which pre-
vented us from explicitly modeling potentially impor-
tant aspects driving rhinoceros poaching. As in Poudyal
et al. (2009), we had to use a proxy (GDP) to capture
demand for rhinoceros horn in consumers’ countries. In
our economic model, we assumed that the legal price
of rhinoceros horn would remain constant over time. At
this stage, it is not possible to estimate a full-price quan-
tity model for rhinoceros horn. Yet, our results highlight
that even at a lower selling price than the illegal price
(currently > $50,000/kg) (Milliken & Shaw 2012) the
profit generated could cover important protection costs
required to maintain the rhinoceros population above its
current size. Finally, we assumed that poaching pressure
is evenly distributed in space because this information
is currently not available for all conservation areas that
have rhinoceroses.
International donors cannot be expected to raise many
millions of dollars year after year to protect rhinoceroses
from poaching, especially when endless other uses
for conservation resources exist. Similarly, given long-
established cultural beliefs, consumers are unlikely to
reduce their near-future demand for rhinoceros horn. Un-
der current management the southern white rhinoceros
population could go extinct in <20 years. Instead, our
results suggest that a legal trade in horn that does not re-
quire killing any rhinoceroses could cover higher protec-
tion costs, allowing the rhinoceros population to increase
in size. A legal trade could also provide sustainable eco-
nomic incentives to local stakeholders. At the same time,
policy makers in South Africa should be careful in advo-
cating for CITES to lift a 35-year-old ban on rhinoceros
horn products unless the funding generated from the
trade will be reinvested in improved protection of the
rhinoceros population. The recent escalation in poaching
in South Africa and the recent losses of 3 subspecies of
rhinoceroses elsewhere in Asia and Africa (Milliken &
Shaw 2012) make it timely to evaluate, discuss, and test
alternatives to the present long-standing policy.
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